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Abstract 
In this paper we compare sources of economic growth in Japan and Korea from 1985 to 
2004, focusing on the role of information technology (IT), based on the framework of 
Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005). In both countries, the information technology 
industry is an important source of economic and productivity growth from the output 
side. In addition, active IT investments are supposed to lead to substantial IT capital 
service contribution to economic growth from the input side. 
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Due to the declining birthrate in Japan, the labor contribution to the GDP growth rate 
is expected to be negative in the long term, and productivity growth is the only one 
driving force of the Japanese economy. Therefore, increasing the TFP growth rate has 
become one of the top priority policy goals in the Japanese government. As the role of 
information technology in economic growth becomes larger and larger, promoting IT 
investments and facilitating effective use of IT systems are important not only for 
improving the competitiveness of Japanese industries, but also for the long term 
macroeconomic growth of the Japanese economy.     
In this paper, the impact of information technology on the macro level economic growth 
rate is investigated by using a growth accounting framework from 1985 to 2004. This 
paper is based on the theoretical framework in Jorgenson (2002), and the methodology 
in Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005) is used for empirical treatments of Japanese data. 
The growth decomposition results in Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005) until 2003 are 
extended to those of until 2004, which enables us to look at the situation after 2000.     
In this paper, the growth decomposition results in Japan are compared to those of Korea 
as well. Both Japan and Korea are major IT producing countries. The total revenue of 
the Samsung group is now larger than Matsushita and Sony, and Hynix Semiconductor, 
a spinout from the Hyundai Group is the second largest DRAM producer after Samsung 
Electronics. Therefore, it is interesting to compare the contribution of IT in the output 
side of GDP. 
In terms of the input side story, IT contributes to GDP growth by IT capital services as well as TFP growth by the IT-producing sector. It is found that the growing IT capital 
contribution does not lead to TFP growth in the IT using industries in Japan (Jorgenson 
and Motohashi, 2005). Slower decision-making and rigid organizational structure may 
be culprits of under-utilization of IT systems at Japanese firms (Motohashi, 2007). In 
contrast, decision-making at Korean firms may be faster due to a top down system. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief introduction of the 
analytical framework and compares the data between Japan and Korea. It is important 
to make sure that both datasets are comparable, because it is found that differences in 
the definition and methodology in software investments and IT prices lead to significant 
bias to international comparisons (Jorgenson and Motohashi, 2005). Then, the sizes of 
IT investment, capital stock, and rental services in Japan and Korea are provided in the 
following section. In this section, the levels and speed of informatization of the two 
countries are compared. Next, a section of the growth decomposition results follows. 
Since significant differences in IT prices are found, a sensitivity analysis of IT prices is 
also provided. Finally, this paper concludes with a summary of observations and next 
steps.  
2.  Analytical Framework and Data 
(1) Framework 
The performance of computer and communications equipments is improving at an 
astonishing speed. Such technological progress hinges on Moore’s Law, which states 
that the density of semiconductor chips double every 18 months. Miniaturization of ICs 
enables faster speed of processing which enhances performance of information 
communication technology equipment. Due to this rapid performance improvement, constant quality IT output as well as investment grows much faster than its nominal 
values. In order to capture the size of IT output and input to the macro economy, we 
apply the production possibility frontier approach introduced by Jorgenson (1995), as 
follows.      ) , , , , ( )   ,   ,   , ( n L K K K K X A GDP P P P Y t s c n t s c ⋅ = .                       ( 1 )  
Aggregate output Y consists of, computer production c P , software production s P , 
communications equipment production t P , and non-IT components of GDP  n GDP 4. 
Aggregate input X consists of non-IT capital services n K , computer services c K , 
software services s K , communications equipment services t K , and labor services L. 
Total factor productivity (TFP) is denoted A. This framework is almost the same as that 
of Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005), but we do not take into account consumer and 
government capital services in this paper due to data constraints in Korea.   
Under the assumption that product and factor markets are competitive, producer 
equilibrium implies that the share-weighted growth of outputs is the sum of the 
share-weighted growth of inputs and total factor productivity growth:   
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where  w and  v denote average value shares of outputs and inputs, respectively, in 
adjacent time periods.   
The shares of outputs and inputs add to one under the assumption of constant returns: 
1 . . . . , , , , = + + + + = + + + L t K s K c K n K n GDP t P s P c P v v v v v w w w w          ( 3 )  
                                                  
4  Here, the production of IT component does not include the amount of the IT 
component used as an intermediate input such as company use of prepackaged software 
not capitalized as an investment.     In equation (2), the growth rate of outputs is a weighted average of growth rate of 
investments and consumption goods outputs. Similarly, the growth rate of inputs is a 
weighted average of growth rates of capital and labor services inputs. The contribution 
of TFP is derived as the difference between the growth rates of output and input.   
  (2) Output data 
In Japan, the Economic Social Research Institute (ESRI) of the Cabinet Office publishes 
an official GDP series. We use this official GDP series for the macro level output of the 
economy as a point of departure for Japanese data. Recently, there are some notable 
changes in this data. First, it is revised in accordance with the recommendations on the 
System of National Accounts by the United Nations in 1993 (SNA93). Major changes in 
this revision include (1) treating custom-made software in business and public sectors 
as an investment, instead of intermediate inputs, and (2) adding the depreciation of 
public infrastructure to government consumption. Adding these new components to 
GDP makes about a 2% increase in its size. This change leads to an upward revision of 
GDP growth rate as well, because software investments grow faster than the 
aggregated economy. ESRI publishes this revised data series from 1980, so we can use 
93SNA data for this paper.   
Second, ESRI started to publish a chain-weighted index GDP in 2004. The official 
Japanese GDP is based on a fixed-weighted index by changing its bench mark year, 
every five years. However, fixed-weighted indexes do not take into account the 
structural change of output composition within the five years, and the growing role of IT 
in the aggregated economy may not be taken into account appropriately. Therefore, we 
use the chain-weighted GDP series in this paper. However, ESRI publishes historical data of chain weighted-indexes only after 1994, so that we have to rely on 
fixed-weighted index data for 1993 and earlier.   
Another problem with Japanese data is that only custom-made software is treated as an 
investment in GDP. In the United States, not only custom-made software, but also 
prepackaged software and own account software are treated as an investment. 
Therefore, we estimated the amount of prepackaged and own account software as is the 
case in Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005). In the benchmark Input Output Table in 2000, 
the amount of prepackaged software capitalized in the balance sheet of enterprises is 
estimated and added to the gross capital formation column. We use the share of 
capitalized prepackaged software investment to the total in 2000 (40.6%) for the whole 
period, because there is no information available in the other years. As for own account 
software, we have applied a cost-based approach, taking into account own account 
software engineers’ labor compensations and associated other types of inputs, following 
the U.S. methodology (Parker and Grimm, 2000). 
In this paper, IT output includes: (1) computer and peripherals, (2) communications 
equipment, and (3) all three types of software. The data for the IT sector is estimated 
based on benchmark input output tables every five years, as well as annual extension 
tables by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).5  Based on the data of 
these IT outputs and non-IT outputs (total GDP minus IT outputs), a divisia output 
index is estimated by equation (2).       
In Korea, the Bank of Korea provides official GDP data, which is used as the output 
data in this paper. The official GDP of Korea is also based on fixed-weighted indexes, 
                                                  
5  Details in IT output data are available in Motohashi (2002).   and not chain-weighted indexes. Therefore, we have to use fixed-weighted GDP as a 
starting point. But one upside of the Korean GDP is that the official statistics has 
already taken into account all three kinds of software. Prepackaged software priced at 
more than 500,000 won is taken into account as an investment, and the amount of own 
account software is estimated by using a similar methodology to that of the U.S. (Bank 
of Korea, 2003). 
The Bank of Korea started to publish GDP data with software treatment after the 2000 
benchmark series, and historical data back to 1990 are also available. Therefore, we use 
SNA93 data for the period of 1990 to 2004 and SNA68 data with no software treatment 
for 1989 and earlier6. IT output data are estimated by using the linked input output 
table of 1985-90-95 and 1990-95-2000. Interpolation within five years and extrapolation 
until 2004 are made by the data from the manufacturing census and survey, and trade 
statistics. Based on the total GDP as well as IT output data, a Divisia output index is 
calculated again by equation (2).       
  (3) IT price data 
It is found that the differences in the methodology in price indexes leads to substantial 
variations of IT price data across countries. In order to take into account fast 
performance improvements in computers, hedonic methods have become a common 
practice in statistical offices in OECD countries. The Bank of Japan started to publish 
hedonic price deflators for computers in the 1995 benchmark WPI (Wholesale Price 
Index), and has kept this methodology for the 2000 benchmark CGPI (Corporate Good 
                                                  
6  For 1985-1989, software production is estimated assuming constant growth of 
software production during 1985-1990, using data from the 1985-1990-1995 linked 
input output table, and the official GDP has been adjusted during this period.   Price Index) as well.7  However, the Bank of Korea, which is in charge of the PPI 
(Producer Price Index), does not use the hedonic method for its computer deflators. 
Another important issue for computer deflators is the index number methodology. Both 
the Bank of Japan and the Bank of Korea use Laspeyres price indexes as official 
statistics. However, it is found that fixed-weighted indexes give a substantial upward 
bias to computer prices, because a substantial shift from mainframe computers to 
personal computers can be seen in a broader category of computers (Nomura and 
Samuels, 2004). In general, the price of PCs drops faster than that of mainframe 
computers, and fixed weight systems do not take into account the growing contribution 
of faster price declines of PCs to the aggregated computer price. After the 2000 
benchmark CGPI, the Bank of Japan publishes chain-weighted indexes of computers as 
a reference series, which drop much faster than fixed-weighted indexes.     
In Figure 1, computer prices are compared between Japan and Korea. For Japanese 
data, both fixed-weighted and hedonic ones are displayed. First, we cannot find a big 
difference in the overall size of price change between the two countries. Although the 
hedonic method is not used in the Bank of Korea, its price data seems to capture quality 
change of computers very well. Second, fixed-weighted deflators in Japan and Korea 
show similar trends; the price declines much faster after 2000. This can be explained by 
the increased weight of personal computers after the 2000 benchmark revision. On the 
other hand, the flexible weighted deflator in Japan moves more smoothly over the 
period from 1995 to 2004. 
Figure 1: Computer Price Indexes 
                                                  
7  The Bank of Japan changed the name of index from WPI to CGPI in the 2000 


















































For communications equipment, the rate of price decline after 1995 is slightly higher in 
Korea than in Japan (Figure 2), when comparing official prices. In both countries, 
deflators of communications equipment are based on a matched method, instead of a 
hedonic one, but are based on a very detailed category of items. Therefore, the quality 
change in communications equipment may be treated appropriately in both countries. 
As is the case for computer prices, the BOJ’s official index for the flexible weighted 
deflator is available only from 1995. Therefore, the chain-weighted indexes 
incorporating the changing composition of items within the broad category of 
communications equipment are constructed before 1995, and used for the analysis of 
the Japanese part, as in Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005). 




















































Finally, there are two types of deflators for software in the BOJ’s CSPI (Company 
Service Price Index): i.e., a cost based deflator for custom made software and a matched 
method one for prepackaged software. However, prepackaged software prices are 
available only after 2000, while the prices for custom-made software are available after 
1980. In Korea, only the custom-made software deflator after 1995 is available, and this 
data is also estimated by a cost-based approach, which does not take into account 
productivity growth in the software industry. 8 Therefore, it is found that the price of 
custom-made software has an upward trend in both countries, while the prepackaged 
software price is declining. 
Figure  3: Software Price Indexes 
                                                  
8  In the growth account, the investment deflator of all assets by Pyo et al. (2006) is used 






















































Since there are significant differences in IT price data between the two countries, we 
use “internationally harmonized prices” for estimating the output and input 
contributions to the macro economy, in addition to the results based on official prices. 
The harmonized price for Korea can be derived by the IT price data in Japan adjusted 
by the relative inflation rate of Korea to Japan. The original idea of this deflator was 
presented in Colecchia and Schreyer (2002), and it is used widely in internationally 
comparative studies (Jorgenson and Motohashi, 2005; van Ark et. al, 2002). As the 
benchmark Japanese data, we use chain-weighted price indexes for computer and 
communications equipment. As for prepackaged software, we use the BOJ’s CGPI data 
after 2000, and internationally harmonized data based on the U.S. BEA’s price data 
before 1999. The BOJ’s custom-made software prices are used for both custom-made 
and own account software.   
(4) Input Data 
(a) Capitals services Capital service input in Japan is estimated by following the methodology in Jorgenson 
and Motohashi (2005). First, private and public investment data by 62 capital goods 
category is estimated from the Statistical Bureau’s benchmark input output tables as 
well as METI’s extension tables. Then, this investment series is used to estimate capital 
stock by the perpetual inventory method. Finally, capital service prices are derived by 
using Jorgenson’s rental service formula, taking into account tax structure by 
commodity type. Out of 62 capital goods categories, computer, communications 
equipment, and software are treated as IT sectors. Software investments include all 
three types, i.e., custom-made, prepackaged, and own account software, as is mentioned 
in the section 2 (1).   
In Korea, a similar methodology is used. Input output tables by detailed commodity 
classification are available in 1985, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000. 
Interpolations and extrapolations until 2004 are conducted by using manufacturing 
census and survey data with trade statistics. Finally, we have private and public 
investment data by 39 capital goods categories. These data are used for capital stock 
and capital service input estimations. Out of 39 categories, computer, communications 
equipment and software are treated as IT sectors. In Korean data, all three kinds of 
software are estimated in the 1990-1995-2000 linked input output tables. Interpolations 
and extrapolations until 2004 can be done by using the data in the Information and 
Communication Industry Statistics Yearbook, but there is no software data before 1989. 
Data from the 1985-1990-1995 linked input output table is used to estimate software 
investment during 1985-1990, assuming constant growth during this period and no 
software investment before 1984.   Finally, it is important to take into account land capital contribution to make a fair 
comparison of Japan and Korea. In Japan, both land capital and price data are available 
in its SNA account. However, there is no official land stock data in Korea, so that we 
assume the share of the land stock to total capital stock in Japan to be the same for 
Korea in 1995, and the quality of the land stock in Korea improves by 1% every year.9 
In terms of land price data, we use the Korea National Statistical Office’s (KNSO’s) 
floating land price data with a five-year moving average operation to control for its 
short term fluctuations.     
 (b)  Labor 
Our estimates of labor input are taken from the ICPA project of RIETI (Kuroda et.al, 
2006), originally derived from the KEO database (Keio Economic Observatory, 1996) for 
Japan until 2000 and Pyo et. al. (2006) for Korea until 2002. This is calculated by using 
the data of the number of workers, hours worked, and hourly wage rate cross-classified 
by sex, age, and education. Labor data for Japan has been extended using the 
population projection estimation complied by the National Institute of Population and 
Social Security Research. In Japan, data extension to 2004 is made by estimating labor 
quality improvement by using data from the KEO Database and official population 
projections up to 2050 (NIPSSR, 2002) and total hours worked from the Monthly Labor 
Survey of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. For Korea, data from the Monthly 
Labor Survey of the Ministry of Labor was used to estimate the quality index and data 
on total hours worked from the KNSO’s statistical database was used as the labor 
                                                  
9  In Japan, the quality of land stock improves by 1.07% from 1985 to 1990 and 0.98% 
from 1990 to 1995. This speed slows down after 1995 due to the slowdown of the 
Japanese economy. Therefore, we use 1% for Korea which has a substantially higher 
economic growth rate through out the period of the analysis. quantity index.   
(5) Comparison of IT investments and stock 
Figure 4 displays the percentage share of IT in nominal investment and capital stock in 
Japan and Korea. In both countries, there was a sharp increase in the share of IT 
investment during the late 1990s. The increase was particularly pronounced in Korea, 
where IT investment share more than doubled during 1995-2000. However, after 2000, 
Korea experienced a sharp decline in IT investment share, whereas Japan encountered 
a relatively moderate decline. In terms of the size of IT investment share in the two 
countries, Japan’s share has been larger for most of the period examined.   




























Due to a surge of IT investment during the late 1990s, the share of IT capital stock 
increased in both countries during this period. Once again, the increase was 
particularly marked for Korea, where the share of IT capital stock almost doubled 
during the late 1990s. IT capital stock share was larger in Japan until 1999, but Korea’s 
share has surpassed Japan’s share since 2000.   
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Figure 6 reveals the composition of the 3 types of IT assets in Japan and Korea. A major 
difference in the composition of IT capital stock in Japan and Korea is the size of 
communications equipment capital stock. In Korea, communications equipment capital 
stock records a share of over 50% of total IT capital stock during the entire period, 
whereas in Japan, the share of communications equipment is approximately one-third 
of total IT stock.   
The share of computer capital stock generally exhibits an increasing trend in both 
countries during the entire period, although the size of the share in Japan is much 
higher. In contrast, the share of software capital in Japan dropped until the mid-1990s 
and started to increase its share thereafter, whereas in Korea, the share of software 
capital has generally been increasing since the early 1990s. Once again for software, the 
absolute size of the software share is considerably larger in Japan compared with 
Korea.  
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Figure 7 shows the breakdown of IT capital service value into the relative shares of the 
3 types of IT assets. In terms of the share of IT capital service value, the share of 
software capital value has recently increased its share in both Japan and Korea. The 
increase is particularly sharp in Korea, where the value of software capital service has 
almost doubled in 2004 compared with 2000. The increase in the share of software 
capital service values in Japan and Korea indicates the increasing importance of 
software capital service input in the two countries.   
3.  Results 
As explained in Section 2, differences in IT price indexes could lead to differences in the 
estimates, so we first provide results adjusting for the differences in IT prices between 
Japan and Korea. Table 1 reports the results of the contribution of information 
technology to output and input growths, using internationally harmonized IT price 
indexes for Korea based on best estimate Japanese price indexes as the benchmark10. 
                                                  
10  The benchmark Japanese IT price indexes for computer and communications 
equipment are flexible weighted deflators, while that of software is based on 
harmonized indexes, based on U.S. prices. The GDP growth rate of Japan has plummeted since the early 1990s, whereas in Korea, 
a relatively high growth rate has been sustained during the entire period examined. In 
both countries, the output contribution of IT with respect to overall GDP growth is 
increasing its importance in recent years.   
Table 1: Sources of GDP growth using best estimate and harmonized prices 
(Japan) 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-04
Outputs
Gross Domestic Product 4.70 1.50 1.14 1.27
Contribution of Information Technology 0.48 0.10 0.56 0.39
Computers 0.27 0.10 0.16 0.28
Software 0.09 0.01 0.23 0.20
Communications Equipment 0.13 -0.01 0.17 -0.09
Contribution of Non-Information Technology 4.22 1.39 0.58 0.88
Inputs
Gross Domestic Income 2.96 0.63 0.48 0.28
Contribution of Information Technology Capital Services 0.43 0.19 0.39 0.34
Computers 0.26 0.13 0.18 0.14
Software 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.14
Communications Equipment 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.07
Contribution of Non-Information Technology Capital Serv 1.23 0.68 0.37 0.07
Contribution of Labor Services 1.30 -0.24 -0.28 -0.13
Total Factor Productivity 1.74 0.87 0.66 0.99
 (Korea) 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-04
Outputs
Gross Domestic Product 9.18 7.54 4.29 4.53
Contribution of Information Technology 0.72 0.50 1.51 1.06
Computers 0.25 0.21 0.56 0.02
Software -0.02 0.09 0.24 0.20
Communications Equipment 0.49 0.21 0.71 0.85
Contribution of Non-Information Technology 8.46 7.03 2.78 3.47
Gross Domestic Income 6.53 4.95 2.32 3.53
Contribution of Information Technology Capital Services 0.35 0.30 0.59 0.58
Computers 0.12 0.11 0.19 0.08
Software 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.29
Communications Equipment 0.19 0.11 0.24 0.21
Contribution of Non-Information Technology Capital Serv 3.99 2.65 1.24 2.05
Contribution of Labor Services 2.19 2.00 0.49 0.89
Total Factor Productivity 2.66 2.58 1.97 1.00
Inputs
 
In terms of the contribution of the specific type of IT output, the contribution of 
computer and software accounts for a major portion of the increase in the IT output 
contribution in Japan, whereas in Korea, communications equipment output plays a 
dominant role. The increase in the contribution of communications equipment output to 
GDP growth is particularly marked during the early 2000s, reflecting the sharp 
increase in communications equipment production in Korea.   
With regards to the input contribution, the contribution of IT capital services in Japan 
dropped temporarily during the early 1990s, but has increased again since the late 
1990s, playing a crucial contribution to input growth of the Japanese economy in recent 
years. Similarly in Korea, the contribution of IT capital services has increased its 
contribution since the late 1990s, reflecting the rapid capital accumulation during this 
period.  
In terms of the specific type of IT asset that contributed to GDP growth, one difference 
between Japan and Korea is the relative size of the contribution of communications equipment, as was the case for the output contribution. The relative size of the 
contribution of communications equipment capital services has been much higher in 
Korea, reflecting the large share of communications equipment capital with respect to 
total IT stock, as indicated in Section 3.   
The major difference in the input contribution between Japan and Korea in recent years 
is due to the contribution of non-IT capital services and labor services. In Japan, labor 
input has been decreasing since the 1990s, contributing negatively to economic growth. 
In addition, the contribution of non-IT capital services has also been declining steadily, 
recording a close to 0 percentage point contribution during the early 2000s. In Korea, 
the contribution of non-IT and labor capital services still accounts for a major portion of 
input growth, in contrast to Japan.   
Table 2 presents the results of the sources of TFP growth. In Japan, TFP growth in the 
IT sector accounts for more than 40% of overall TFP growth since the late 1990s. In 
particular, the contribution of TFP growth in the computer-producing sector is the 
dominant source of TFP growth. Similarly in Korea, the IT sector has contributed 
strongly to TFP growth, and the contribution of the IT sector to overall TFP growth is 
increasing importance. However, TFP growth in the non-IT sector has been declining in 
recent years. Out of the IT sectors, one feature of the source of Korean TFP growth is 
the large contribution of the communications equipment sector.   
Table 2: Decomposition of TFP Growth (Japan) 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-04
Total Factor Productivity Growth 1.74 0.87 0.66 0.99
Contributions to TFP Growth:
Information Technology 0.36 0.25 0.30 0.47
C o m p u t e r s 0 . 1 90 . 1 60 . 1 70 . 2 7
Software 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.09
Communications Equipment 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.12
Non-Information Technology 1.38 0.62 0.36 0.51
Relative Price Changes:
Information Technology -9.39 -6.31 -6.34 -7.78
Computers -13.10 -10.52 -12.35 -23.10
Software -0.94 -2.54 -0.14 -3.25
Communications Equipment -10.00 -4.72 -9.41 -12.44
Non-Information Technology -4.12 -1.65 -0.74 -1.01
Average Nominal Shares:
Information Technology 4.17 3.86 4.31 4.94
C o m p u t e r s 1 . 5 11 . 4 31 . 3 71 . 1 7
Software 1.04 1.18 1.62 2.85
Communications Equipment 1.62 1.25 1.32 0.91
Non-Information Technology 95.83 96.14 95.69 95.06
 
(Korea) 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-04
Total Factor Productivity Growth 2.66 2.58 1.97 1.00
Contributions to TFP Growth:
Information Technology 0.48 0.43 0.61 1.28
Computers 0.12 0.15 0.25 0.48
Software 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.11
Communications Equipment 0.33 0.25 0.35 0.69
Non-Information Technology 2.18 2.15 1.36 -0.28
Relative Price Changes:
Information Technology -11.92 -11.23 -12.11 -12.71
Computers -15.56 -15.39 -15.50 -26.42
Software -10.63 -11.28 -3.44 -5.70
Communications Equipment -12.47 -9.60 -12.56 -15.76
Non-Information Technology -6.61 -6.53 -3.57 -3.64
Average Nominal Shares:
Information Technology 3.87 3.86 5.52 7.93
Computers 0.88 0.97 1.79 1.53
Software 0.27 0.33 0.79 1.97
Communications Equipment 2.73 2.56 2.94 4.44
Non-Information Technology 96.13 96.14 94.48 92.07
 
To check for sensitivity in price adjustments, we present results using official price 
statistics of Japan and Korea in Table 3. In addition, we exclude land capital for the two 
countries to see the impact of land on the growth accounting estimates. The results for 
Japan show that both input and output contributions of IT decrease compared to the 
estimates using best price estimates. Since official price statistics of Japan do not use flexible weights for computers and communications equipment, the rapid decline in 
personal computers for example, is not captured accurately in the price indexes, 
resulting in a lower recorded contribution for both input and output growths. Similarly 
for software, the price index for prepackaged software in the official prices of Japan 
assumes no productivity growth in the software industry, and the results of the 
estimates using official prices decrease the input and output contributions of software. 
However, the sizes of the adjustments are relatively smaller in Japan.   
The estimates for Korea using official price indexes indicate that the estimates using 
official price indexes generally increase the contribution of IT, compared with 
harmonized price estimates. Since the inflation rate is high in Korea and low (negative 
in recent years) in Japan, the price decline in IT prices using harmonized price indexes 
is not sharp compared to the baseline IT prices of Japan. Therefore, the price decline of 
IT generally drops more rapidly in the official price statistics compared with 
harmonized price indexes. The estimates using official price statistics of Korea provide 
further support for the strong contribution of IT for both output and input growths for 
the Korean economy.   
We have found substantial changes in TFP estimates for both countries due to smaller 
capital inputs without land stock. Since land input grows quite slowly compared to 
depreciable asset stocks, capital inputs without taking land into account are 
substantially over-biased, which leads to under-biased TFP estimates. This point should 
be noted because there are many studies which do not treat land as a capital input. 
 
Table 3: Sources of GDP using official IT prices (Japan) 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-04
Outputs
Gross Domestic Product 4.69 1.48 1.00 1.17
Contribution of Information Technology 0.47 0.09 0.41 0.30
Computers 0.27 0.10 0.10 0.23
Software 0.08 0.00 0.22 0.19
Communications Equipment 0.12 -0.02 0.10 -0.13
Contribution of Non-Information Technology 4.22 1.39 0.58 0.88
Inputs
Gross Domestic Income 3.37 0.94 0.41 0.16
Contribution of Information Technology Capital Services 0.46 0.20 0.31 0.27
Computers 0.28 0.14 0.14 0.09
Software 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.14
Communications Equipment 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04
Contribution of Non-Information Technology Capital Serv 1.61 0.98 0.38 0.02
Contribution of Labor Services 1.30 -0.24 -0.28 -0.13
Total Factor Productivity 1.32 0.54 0.58 1.01
 
(Korea) 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-04
Outputs
Gross Domestic Product 9.18 7.52 4.28 4.54
Contribution of Information Technology 0.77 0.69 1.44 1.52
Computers 0.26 0.26 0.52 0.19
Software -0.03 0.07 0.24 0.21
Communications Equipment 0.54 0.36 0.68 1.12
Contribution of Non-Information Technology 8.41 6.83 2.84 3.02
Inputs
Gross Domestic Income 7.57 7.46 3.50 4.32
Contribution of Information Technology Capital Services 0.41 0.51 0.72 0.89
Computers 0.13 0.19 0.23 0.19
Software 0.04 0.08 0.16 0.32
Communications Equipment 0.24 0.24 0.33 0.38
Contribution of Non-Information Technology Capital Serv 4.98 4.94 2.28 2.54
Contribution of Labor Services 2.19 2.00 0.49 0.89
Total Factor Productivity 1.60 0.06 0.79 0.22
 
4.  Conclusion 
In order to rigorously compare the economic growth contributions of Japan and Korea, 
focusing on the role of IT, we conducted growth accounting using the framework of Jorgenson and Motohashi(2005). To adjust for differences in IT data between the two 
countries, we have estimated annual investment series for computers, communications 
equipment, and three types of software assets, and to control for differences in the price 
indexes for IT, internationally harmonized price indexes were created for Korea, using 
Japanese price indexes as the benchmark.   
From the output side, our results indicate that the contribution of IT output has become 
a major source of GDP growth for Japan and Korea since the late 1990s. Similarly, 
growth contributions of IT to input growth, through the contribution of IT capital 
services, has also increased importance since the late 1990s.   
The major difference in the sources of economic growth between Japan and Korea is due 
to the contribution of non-IT capital services and labor services. The contribution of 
labor in Japan has been negative since the early 1990s, and the contribution of non-IT 
capital services is also declining, recording close to a zero percentage point contribution 
in the early 2000s. In contrast, the contribution of labor and non-IT capital services is 
still a major source of input growth in Korea, although the level of contribution has 
dropped since the late 1990s.   
In both countries, the IT-producing sector contributes significantly to TFP growth, and 
there is an increasing trend in the contribution, reflecting the increasing importance of 
the IT sector in these economies. The contribution of TFP growth of the IT sector in 
Korea has been higher than in Japan, and the gap is widening in recent years. However, 
the TFP growth rate of the non-IT sector in Korea has been decreasing, and in the early 
2000s, the TFP growth rate of the non-IT sector was higher in Japan than in Korea. 
However, IT is not the only factor to explain TFP. Innovation activities, regulatory environments, macro economic stability, and many other factors also have some impact 
on TFP. In order to investigate the relationship between IT investment and productivity, 
it is important to perform analyses at the micro level. In Japan, Motohashi (2007) uses 
firm level micro-data to analyze the impact of IT network use on productivity. Kanamori 
and Motohashi (2006) investigate the complementarities of organizational change 
(centralization and decentralization of decision right) and IT capital stock. We hope that 
similar studies will be conducted in Korea to understand the differences between the 
two countries in more detail. Reference 
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